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Doctrine of Happiness1
Introduction
The ethics of St !omas Aquinas features two main parts: his famous theory of natural law2 and his equally famous doctrine on human happiness. !e 
doctrine on happiness is paradigmatically formulated in the so-called happiness-
treatise of Summa theologiae I-II q. 1-5 as well as in Aquinas’ Commentary on the 
Sentences;3 and in further detail in his Summa contra gentiles4 and other writings.5 
Aquinas advocates a eudemonistic ethics and thus situates himself in the classical 
tradition and its Christian treatment by Augustine. In this paper, I will pursue 
the role Augustine plays in Aquinas’ ethics of happiness.
!e reason why this topic requires consideration is that St !omas Aquinas is 
o"en represented as an Aristotelian who abandoned the Platonic and therewith 
also the Augustinian tradition. According to this reading, Aquinas - while 
adopting Aristotle’s epistemology and his critique of Plato’s metaphysics of 
ideas - also denies the strongly transcendence-oriented thinking of the Platonist 
Augustine, and develops in its stead a theology rooted in this life - that is, in 
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concrete sense-mediated experience. A similar argument is made concerning 
his ethics: Drawing on Aristotle, Aquinas establishes an ethics that does not 
immediately inquire into the perfect happiness of the herea!er but rather 
concentrates on human happiness in this life. "is line of interpretation, which 
casts Aquinas’ ethics as Aristotelian and therefore as anti-Augustinian, has 
become so prominent that recent essays on St "omas Aquinas’ treatise on 
happiness neglect Augustine as a source for Aquinas, and interpret the latter’s 
ethics exclusively in an Aristotelian vein.6 
I believe that this interpretation is inadequate. I will here attempt to show that 
Aquinas’ doctrine on happiness cannot be understood without the Augustinian 
heritage.7 Undoubtedly, Aquinas is very familiar with Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, and shortly before composing Summa theologiae I-II, he had commented 
in detail on this work.8 And Aquinas does indeed include many of Aristotle’s 
individual theses in his ethics. But he was also intimately acquainted with 
Augustine’s thought. "e Libri sententiarum of Peter Lombard, which Aquinas 
commented on during his #rst stay in Paris, consist primarily of quotations from 
Augustine. Moreover, Aquinas cites numerous works of Augustine, including De 
civitate Dei, De Genesi ad litteram, and the Confessiones. Quantitative analysis 
demonstrates that, a!er the Bible, Aristotle is the most cited author in St 
"omas Aquinas’ happiness-treatise, followed by Augustine. But this fact alone 
does not tell us much about the systematic weight of these authors. Furthermore, 
in the time around 1270, Aristotle was a relatively newly discovered and still 
controversial author, whose thought was more in need of explication than 
Augustine’s, who had long been recognized as an ecclesiastical authority.
 6 For Aquinas’s doctrine on happiness cf. Leo Elders, !e Ethics of St !omas Aquinas: 
Happiness, Natural Law and the Virtues (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005); Dennis J.M. 
Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral 
Science (Washington D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997); Rochus Leonhardt, 
Glück als Vollendung des Menschseins: Die beatitudo-Lehre des !omas von Aquin im Horizont des 
Eudämonismus-Problems (Berlin: de Gruiter, 1998); Andreas Speer, “Das Glück des Menschen 
(S" I-II 1-5),” in !omas von Aquin: Die Summa theologiae; Werkinterpretationen, ed. Andreas 
Speer (Berlin: De Gruiter, 2005), 141-166. While Elders is generally aware of the connections 
between Aquinas and Augustine, Bradley and Leonhardt give little account of the Bishop of 
Hippo. Speer leaves Augustine completely unmentioned.
 7 For Augustine’s teaching on happiness cf. Werner Beierwaltes, Regio beatitudinis: Zu 
Augustins Begri% des glücklichen Lebens (Heidelberg: Winter, 1981); Henrique de Noronha 
Galvao, “Beatitudo,” in Augustinus Lexikon, ed. Cornelius Petrus Mayer et al. (Basel: Schwabe, 
1996), 1: 623-638; Friedemann Buddensiek, “Augustinus über das Glück,” in Augustinus: Ethik 
und Politik, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Würzburg: Wurzburger Augustinus-Studientag, 2009), 63-
85.
 8 Cf. In X Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis.
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Principles of Eudemonistic Ethics
Before we consider Aquinas’ ethics of happiness and its Augustinian 
sources, some of the principles should be recognized that were decisive for the 
eudaimonistic ethical theories in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, as they were 
also for both Aristotle and Augustine. 
1)  !e basis of eudemonistic ethics is a teleology of human action. 
According to this conception, a central feature of action is that it occurs 
for the sake of an end and that it is therefore aimed at a goal. !e goals 
of various actions do not exist unrelatedly side by side; they are, rather, 
ordered in a hierarchy. Some goals of action are strived for because they 
serve as means for reaching higher goals. !ese goals may, in turn, be 
strived for in the realization of more encompassing ends. !e hierarchy 
of the goals of action should thus be understood as being structured in 
the form of a pyramid. At its summit is a single "nal goal (nis ultimus) 
for the sake of which one aims at all of the other goals. In the end, it is 
towards this "nal goal that each and every action is aimed. 
2)  Eudemonistic ethics derives its name because happiness (eudaimonia) 
is established as its highest goal. In everything a human person does, he 
is ultimately striving to be happy. “Everybody wants to be happy” is a 
frequently repeated principle of eudemonistic ethics.9 It is an ethics of 
striving, in the sense that it adopts a natural human impulse in order to 
steer and canalize it. Since humans have always already sought happiness, 
ethics need not occasion in them an entirely new will as Kant’s duty ethics 
intends. !e task of a eudemonistic ethics consists rather in leading the 
naturally existing striving to its proper goal. 
3)  Eudemonistic ethics includes a doctrine of goods. As the "nal goal, 
happiness is simultaneously the highest good. !e question quickly 
arises, however: What makes humans happy? Which goods must one 
possess in order to share in happiness? Departing from this question, 
eudemonistic ethics develops an evaluation of goods according to which 
some goods contribute little to happiness - these are the lower goods - 
while others contribute more - these are the higher goods. It is at this 
juncture that the critical concern of eudemonistic ethics comes to the 
fore: It shows that some goods which many people consider as high-
ranking (for example, honour, pleasure, and wealth) are in truth low-
 9 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I 2, 1095a 18; Cicero, Hortensius, ed. Laila Straume-
Zimmermann, Ferdinand Broemser and Olof Gigon (Munich: Artemis, 1990), frag. 69I / 70I, 
S. 68f. Augustine, De Trinitate XIII 7-9.
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ranking or even illusionary goods to be viewed as ills rather than goods. 
Humans, in short, tend to search for happiness in the wrong places, o!en 
erring in their pursuit of happiness. 
4) Eudemonistic ethics aims at rendering the human perfect. Accordingly, 
the individual person has to attain the appropriate constitution of the 
soul in order to be able to be happy. Happiness does not depend on 
the possession of external goods but rather on the cultivation of inner 
attitudes. For this reason, virtue is o!en represented as a particular 
disposition of character, as a high good that is indispensable for human 
happiness. Whoever possesses this good arrives at a condition of mental 
perfection characterized by inner unity, harmony, and peace. 
5) Eudemonistic ethics is oriented towards the essence of the human, and 
therefore has an objective character. When it critically assesses particular 
goods, individual preferences do not constitute its measure. Instead, 
the assessment is based on considerations of human nature in general. 
Subjective wishes are appraised on a basis considered objective - human 
nature. In this nature reason plays a prominent role because it is through 
reason that humans distinguish themselves from other beings. "e good 
life, from an eudemonistic perspective, is a life of reason and thus a life 
corresponding to human nature. "rough action a person may more or 
less cultivate this nature. Happiness is bound to human perfection in 
the sense of the complete development of human nature and its essence. 
It can thus be said that the highest goal lies in human self-realization, 
though this should not be understood as a characteristic of individual 
particularity, but as the perfected development of the human, which is 
common to all humans. 
6) For most forms of eudemonism the human relation to God is important. 
God is deemed the metaphysical basis of all beings, who as such is 
transcendent over and above all particular things. With his reason and his 
will, the human is related not only to individual goods but also to God as 
the transcendent principle of all of reality. He strives for knowledge and 
enjoyment of God. "erefore, in eudemonistic ethics, God is thought to 
be the highest good of humankind, a good that encompasses all other 
goods. In the enjoyment of God, the human reaches its perfection and 
becomes completely happy. 
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Augustinian Elements in Aquinas’ Doctrine
I now come to speak about Aquinas’ happiness-treatise in Summa theologiae 
I-II q. 1-5. I will explicate its most signi!cant points with reference to Augustine 
or Aristotle. 
e Distinction Between Finis Cuius and Finis Quo (Q. 1)
e !rst quaestio of the happiness-treatise begins with a theory of action. 
Aquinas demonstrates that every action is aimed at a goal. e goals of action 
compose, in turn, a hierarchy at the top of which is a !nal goal (nis ultimus). 
Aquinas !rst distinguishes (a.1) “human actions” (actiones humanae) from 
“actions of humans” (actiones hominis). In human actions, the individual is 
master, governing actions by reason and will. In contrast, the “actions of humans” 
include re#ex and habitual actions that are not subject to conscious control. Such 
actions are not typically human as they also occur among animals. Reason and 
will, which inform human actions (actiones humanae), coalesce in the capacity 
of free decision (liberum arbitrium) through which the human is master of his 
actions. All kinds of actions are goal-oriented, even those of animals. But the 
human himself directs his actions towards their goal by means of his capacity for 
free decision (liberum arbitrium), whereas in their actions animals follow their 
instincts, which God has given them. In the positing of goals, animals do not 
act, therefore, in the manner of self-determination, as the human does. ey are 
instead determined externally (that is, by God). 
e goal of an individual action o$en proves to be a means to attaining 
an even higher goal. For example, Aquinas asks (a.4), whether there is a !nal, 
highest goal (nis ultimus) of human action or whether the hierarchy of goals is 
in!nite so that a progressus in innitum arises. According to him, such a progressus 
is impossible. He insists that every human action has a !nal goal, a goal therefore 
that is intended not for the sake of another goal but in and for itself. Aquinas 
goes on to argue that not only must each individual human action have a !nal 
goal but that all of one person’s actions must also be directed towards a single 
!nal goal (a.6). He even goes so far as to claim that all actions of all humans are 
ultimately directed towards one and the same !nal goal (a.7). 
In the last article (a.8) of the !rst quaestio, Aquinas draws a distinction in the 
concept of goal (nis), which is terminologically di%cult to grasp, but possesses 
systematic signi!cance for his entire treatise on happiness. Aquinas di&erentiates 
between “goal” in the sense of “wherefore” (nis cuius) and “goal” in the sense of 
“whereby” (nis quo). Aquinas maintains that this distinction is to be observed 
especially when one speaks of the !nal goal. Whence comes this distinction? 
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What does it mean? And why does Aquinas believe it is necessary?
Terminologically, the distinction comes from Aristotle. In !ve passages of his 
work, Aristotle writes that the goal is two-fold.10 In Metaphysics XII 7 and in 
De anima II 4, he speaks of a hou heneka tinos (Latin: nis cuius) and of a hou 
heneka tini (Latin: nis quo). ese passages are very di#cult to interpret. I will 
highlight the passage from De anima II 4 (415b2f.) because Aquinas addresses 
this passage in his Commentary on De anima. Aristotle explains his distinction 
using the example of animals, plants, and all living beings in general. Such beings 
naturally strive for procreation and reproduction because, as Aristotle points 
out, through the preservation of their kind, they obtain their share of the eternal. 
In Aquinas’ interpretation of the example, eternity is the goal towards which 
animals and plants truly strive. It is the goal in the sense of the hou heneka tinos or 
of the nis cuius. In contrast, reproduction is the goal in the sense that living beings 
reach eternity through reproduction, which is the goal in the sense of “whereby” 
(hou heneka tini or nis quo).11 Aquinas himself o$ers further examples, beyond 
Aristotle, in order to clarify the doubleness of the goal. A doctor, for instance, 
acts for the purpose of health; this is his principale intentum: sanitatis causa agit 
medicus. e health of the body is thus the nis cuius of the doctor. e doctor 
also, however, aims at a goal in the sense of the “whereby” (nis quo). e goal 
in this sense is that by which health is reached, namely the warming of the body. 
Aquinas takes another example from physics. He claims that, when a falling 
body is moving downwards, the underlying ground is the goal in the sense of the 
“wherefore” (nis cuius); its residing there is, in contrast, the goal in the sense of 
the “whereby” (nis quo). His most descriptive example, however, is drawn from 
ethics. He asks: Which goal does the miser pursue? According to Aquinas, this 
goal can be described in two ways. On the one hand, one could say that the goal 
of every one of the miser’s actions is money; this statement speci!es the nis 
cuius. Or, on the other hand, one could say that the miser wants the possession or 
the enjoyment of money; this would be a formulation of the nis quo.
e example of the doctor could suggest that the “whereby” is merely a means 
for attaining the “wherefore”: rough warming, the sick person attains health. 
 10 De anima II 4, 415b 2-3; b 20-21; Metaphysics XII 7, 1072b 1-3; Physics II 2, 194a 35-
36; Eudemian Ethics VIII 3, 1249b 13-16. For an interpretation of these passages cf. Konrad 
Gaiser, “Das zweifache Telos bei Aristoteles,” in Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und "eophrast, 
ed. Ingemar Düring (Heidelberg: Stiehm, 1969), 97-113; Friedo Ricken, “Hou heneka / 
worumwillen,” in Aristoteles-Lexikon, ed. Otfried Hö$e (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 2005). 
Aquinas explicitly refers to Physics II and Metaphysics V, where Aristotle simply states that the 
goal is two-fold.
 11 Cf. omas Aquinas, Sententia De anima II, lectio 7 n.8.
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e examples of the falling body and of the miser make it clear, however, what 
the distinction entails. e lower-lying place and the money are both goals in the 
sense of a concrete external object that is strived for. In contrast, the “residing 
there” of the body, and the possession and enjoyment of money respectively 
pertain to inner conditions of the one who is striving. I will illustrate this point 
once again with the example of the miser: His action may be described from 
two perspectives. First, one could say that in everything that the miser does he is 
striving for a particular object, namely money. Why does he do this or do that? 
He does it for the money. is perspective provides the nis cuius (wherefore). 
Secondly, one could also say that the miser acts in order to possess or enjoy 
money precisely because he wants to have it. Here it is a matter of the nis quo 
(whereby). e miser strives for a personal condition of possession, but this 
condition only materializes when he has money as an external object. 
Aquinas uses this interpretation of the distinction between nis cuius and nis 
quo also and explicitly with reference to the !nal goal of all humans. e !nal 
goal of a human being in the sense of the nis cuius is, according to Aquinas, God 
Himself. e !nal goal in the sense of the nis quo is, however, the possession 
and enjoyment of God as found in the knowledge and love of God. e name for 
the condition in which the human !nds himself when he possesses God is called 
“happiness” (eudaimonia; beatitudo). For Aquinas, the !nal goal of humans is 
double, namely God and happiness. is account does not signify that Aquinas’ 
pyramid of the goals of action has two summits. Rather, the same summit is 
considered from two di"erent perspectives. In the !rst, it is a matter of an inner 
condition in which the human !nds himself when he has reached the goal of all 
of his striving; and this condition is happiness. In the second, it is a matter of the 
“object” or the good that he must possess in order to arrive at this condition; and 
this good is God.12 
e distinction of these two perspectives on the nis ultimus proves to be 
quite fruitful. In particular, it allows for a di"erentiated grounding of the thesis 
that all humans share the same !nal goal. It is all too apparent that not all humans 
hold the same goods as worthy of pursuit. While one person strives for fame or 
renown, another strives for money and wealth, a third for power, a fourth for 
knowledge and science, and so on. Humans have various life visions and thus 
pursue di"erent life goals. According to Aquinas, however, all persons are in 
 12 Santeler is very critical about Aquinas’ distinction, but he misunderstands it as introducing 
happiness as a second !nal goal besides God. Cf. Josef Santeler, “Der Endzweck des Menschen 
nach omas von Aquin: Eine kritisch-weiterführende Studie,” Zeitschri! für katholische 
#eologie 87 (1965): 1-60.
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agreement that they are searching for happiness.13 Regardless of whether one 
desires fame, money, or power, one desires it because one hopes to !nd happiness 
in it. erefore, happiness, as nis quo, is the !nal goal of every human. Di#erences 
only arise with respect to the question: In what does an individual seek happiness 
and by what means does he hope to attain it? - that is, which good in the sense 
of the nis cuius does he deem to be the highest? It is in response to this question 
that humans choose di#erent objects as their !nal goal. Admittedly, for Aquinas, 
not all of the subjectively chosen end goals are equally good. Seen objectively, 
wealth and power are lesser goods. Whoever is of the opinion that the !nal goal 
of happiness, in the sense of the nis quo, is to be attained by making these goods 
the !nal goal in the sense of the nis cuius, will be disappointed. He will !nd 
that money is not capable of satisfying the common human desire for happiness. 
"us, while every human seeks happiness, not every one is striving for God as the 
true nis cuius, whose possession alone is capable of bringing happiness. 
"e distinction between nis cuius and nis quo, which Aquinas delineates 
in q. 1 a. 8 of the Summa theologiae I-II, is of structural signi!cance for the 
construction of the entire happiness-treatise of the Summa. Quaestio 2 takes the 
perspective of the nis cuius in discussing the di#erent kinds of goods - external, 
internal, and transcendental. It ends in q. 2 a. 8 with the conclusion that solely 
the uncreated God can be the objectively true highest good of humans in the 
sense of the “wherefore.” Quaestio 3 subsequently investigates beatitudo as inner 
appropriation and thus as nis quo. In q. 3 a.8, Aquinas arrives at the thesis that 
happiness is to be understood as the appropriation or possession of God through 
an intellectual vision of the essence of God. Quaestio 4 remains true to this 
perspective in its analysis of the soul’s acts and habits, which are connected with 
the vision of the divine essence and thus belong to happiness. Quaestio 5 returns 
to the distinction between nis cuius and nis quo. In q. 5 a. 8 Aquinas answers a 
question which both Augustine and Peter Lombard had posed, namely whether 
one can say that all humans want to be happy, even those who, due to objectively 
wrong personal choices regarding goods, are factually proceeding towards 
misery. "e answer to this question lies precisely in the distinction between both 
nes: Indeed all humans want to be happy because all of them strive for happiness 
as their !nal goal in the sense of nis quo. But only those can arrive at happiness 
who have taken the objectively right good, in the sense of the nis cuius, to be 
their !nal goal, namely God.
If the distinction between these two nes acquires such signi!cance 
for Aquinas’ doctrine on happiness, and if he terminologically derives this 
 13 On this point, he draws from Augustine’s De Trinitate XIII 6 in S! I-II 5.8. 
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distinction from the writings of Aristotle, does this not mean that Aristotle, and 
not Augustine, is the decisive author for Aquinas? In order to evaluate this claim, 
we will have to turn to Aquinas’ early writings on the question of happiness, 
especially his Commentary on the Sentences.
Aquinas’ !rst treatise on happiness is found in his Commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard (In quattuor libris sententiarum) - more precisely, in 
his explications of Book IV distinctio 49. At the centre of Lombard’s text there is 
a passage that is almost entirely taken from Augustine’s De Trinitate XIII 7-10.14 
In these analyses, Augustine is primarily dealing with the fact that although all 
humans want to be happy, they seek happiness in di"erent things, for instance 
in pleasure or virtue, or in other things. Despite the fact that all humans know 
what happiness is, not all of them know where to seek it, namely in a life directed 
towards God. In his interpretation of Augustine’s text, Aquinas develops his 
early version of the doctrine on the two-fold !nal goal. He distinguishes here 
between the “interior goal” (nis interius) and the “exterior goal” (nis exterius)15 
and explains the distinction through the example of the miser, just as he does 
later in q. 1 a. 8 of Summa theologiae I-II. #e miser’s external goal is the object 
he strives for, i.e. money. #e interior goal is an act or a condition of the human 
himself, the possession of money. Applied to the question concerning the "nal 
goal (ultimus nis) of humans, it follows that the ultimus nis exterius is God, the 
ultimus nis interius, on the contrary, is the act or condition by which the human 
possesses God. Happiness is the name of that condition. 16
At its core, the doctrine of the two-fold "nal goal is the same in the Commentary 
on the Sentences and in Summa theologiae. However, the Commentary on the 
Sentences shows something more. It demonstrates that the origin of Aquinas’ 
distinction is to be found in Augustine’s re$ections in De Trinitate XIII. Aquinas 
articulates Augustine’s thought at "rst in the terminology of nis interius and nis 
exterius (or bonum per se and bonum per accidens), and only later, in the Summa 
theologiae, does he draw upon Aristotle’s conceptual vocabulary, speaking of nis 
quo and nis cuius. It is apparent, though, that he interprets and clari"es this 
 14 Peter Lombard, Sententiarum libri quattuor IV, d. 49 q. 1 a. 3.
 15 Sent. lib. 4, d.49 q1 a.1 qc. 2. 
 16 In Sent. lib.4 d.49 q.1 a.3 qc.1 Aquinas makes a similar distinction between the bonum/
nis per se and the bonum/nis per accidens. #e bonum per se is the object of human will par 
excellence: it is happiness. #e bonum per accidens is a concrete good whose possession brings 
happiness. #is terminology, however, is poorly chosen because its logic renders God, the highest 
good whose possession makes humans happy, a bonum per accidens, even though God is good 
in Himself, not just accidentally. In later writings, Aquinas designates God precisely as the 
good itself (bonum per se). Probably in order to avoid such confusion, Aquinas abandoned the 
terminology of bonum per se and bonum per accidens a%er his Commentary on the Sentences.
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conceptuality, the meaning of which is di!cult to pin down in Aristotle, in an 
Augustinian vein. He uses the expressions of Aristotle in order to explicate a 
thought of Augustine. It would thus be false to conclude that Aquinas turns from 
Augustine and becomes an Aristotelian. "e example of the doctrine of the two-
fold #nal goal demonstrates, on the contrary, that he puts his Aristotelianism in 
the service of Augustine.
Let us look brie$y at the happiness-treatise of the Summa contra gentiles, 
which is temporally situated between Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences and 
his Summa theologiae. In this work, too, we #nd the distinction between the two 
#nal goals. In Summa contra gentiles III 25, in particular, Aquinas distinguishes 
between the vision of God as an inner act on the part of the human and God 
Himself as the external object of the vision. But Aquinas no longer utilizes 
the terminology of the Commentary on the Sentences in order to express this 
distinction. He does not secure it terminologically at all.17 Obviously, "omas 
uses the doctrine of the two-fold goal throughout his works. Only in his late 
works does he apply Aristotle’s terminology to Augustine’s distinction.
God is the Highest, Perfect, and Universal Good (Q. 2)
In quaestio 2 of the happiness-treatise of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas 
asks which good must a person possess in order to be happy. His question is 
consequently directed at the #nal goal in the sense of the nis cuius. He thus 
treats sequentially the external goods (wealth, honour, fame, power), the bodily 
goods (health, strength), and the soul’s goods (pleasure, virtue). Aquinas o%ers 
four reasons as to why the external goods do not come into question as potential 
#nal goals. First, these types of goods may be found among good and bad people 
alike. Wealth is something which both the wise man and the wicked man can 
both have. "e highest good, however, should exhibit an inner connection to 
morality - that is, it has to be constituted such that only good people can possess 
it. Secondly, the highest good in the sense of the ultimus nis cuius should 
completely ful#ll the person such that no wishes remain open. External goods 
like wealth, honour, fame, and power do not achieve this kind of satisfaction but 
leave much to be desired. "irdly, Aquinas emphasizes that every one of these 
external goods, but especially wealth and fame, can ruin one’s character and lead 
to bad things. "e true highest good, in contrast, makes the person better, even 
 17 Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara, whose commentary on the Leonina edition of the Summa 
contra gentiles is o%ered as an o!cial explication, points out this gap. To #ll it, he refers back in his 
explanation of ScG III 25 to Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences, precisely to the terminology 
of nis interius and nis exterius. 
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unto perfection. And fourthly, the external goods are subject to the vicissitudes 
of luck (fortuna). !e true highest good is not subject to vicissitudes, however, 
because the human is naturally directed toward it.
!e goods of the body do not come into question as the highest  nis cuius 
either, because the human body is subordinated to his soul. Even the goods of the 
soul point beyond themselves. Aquinas brings his distinction between  nis cuius 
and  nis quo to bear on this point. Happiness as  nis quo is indeed a condition 
of the soul, and therefore represents an inherent good of the soul. !e object, 
however, whose possession makes humans happy, namely God as the  nis cuius, 
resides outside of the soul.
At the end of q. 2 (a. 8), Aquinas arrives at the following thesis: !at good 
whose possession makes humans utterly happy must be “uncreated.” He clearly 
means God. While Aristotle does not make the distinction between created and 
uncreated, for Augustine this distinction constitutes the centre of his thinking. 
What becomes clearly recognizable is that Aquinas draws on the Augustinian 
and, beyond it, the Platonic tradition. !is reference is particularly visible in his 
invocation of the notion of participation: God created and maintains the world 
by having things participate in Himself; the created exists by taking part in God. 
If one proceeds through the text of q.2 a.8, one "nds further characterizations 
of God as the highest good. Aquinas writes, for instance, that God is the perfect 
and in"nite good (bonum perfectum et in nitum). Only the uncreated God 
could so ful"ll humans that nothing remains to be desired. !e created goods, in 
contrast, are always "nite and limited. !ey cannot make humans utterly happy. 
What is of particular interest metaphysically is Aquinas’ de"nition of God as 
a universal good (universale bonum),18 a universal source of good (universalis fons 
boni),19 and the subsisting essence of goodness itself (ipsa essentia bonitatis).20 
Aquinas draws here on Augustine’s doctrine on God, and Augustine himself 
acquired it from Plato’s theory of ideas and from the Platonists. Similar to Plato’s 
idea of the good, God is the universal good that endows all individual goods 
with goodness. God is the universal source of goodness because He created all 
individual goods and endowed them with goodness. Finally, God, as bonum 
universale, is not to be conceived as a nominalistic universale post rem; He rather 
subsists as the essence of goodness and is thus ante rem. 
In his explanation of God as the highest good, Aquinas relies heavily on 
Augustine and his adaptation of Platonism. In the sed contra of q. 2 a.8, Aquinas 
refers to Augustine’s De civitate dei XIX 26, where it is written: “God is the 
 18 S" I-II 1.8; 2.8; 2.7; 5.1.
 19 Ibid, 2.8.
 20 S" I 103.3. 
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happy life of humans,” and (with Psalm 114:15) “Happy is the people whose 
lord is God.” Aquinas’ designation of God as ipsa essentia bonitatis is very similar 
to Augustine’s re!ections in De Trinitate VIII 3. According to Augustine, God 
is the ipsum bonum through which the many individual goods are good because 
they participate in him. is ipsum bonum is, for Augustine, the source of all 
good and the highest good (summum bonum), which cannot be augmented or 
diminished because it is not good through participation but by its essence. 
One may be initially surprised that Aquinas draws so heavily from the 
Platonic-Augustinian metaphysics. Was not Aquinas, in matters of metaphysics, 
an Aristotelian? And did not Aristotle dismiss Plato’s theory of ideas and its 
doctrine of participation? Aristotle sharply repudiates Plato’s notion of a good 
that is universal, a bonum universale, claiming that “participation does not 
mean anything.”21 A glance at the happiness-treatise in the Summa theologiae 
demonstrates that although Aquinas rejects Plato’s theory of ideas, he denitely 
adopts the notion of participation. In Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, it is evident how he weakens Aristotle’s negative judgment of the 
participation doctrine.22 Aquinas even alters Aristotle’s critique of the ideas such 
that it merely aims at undermining the conception of the universal good as a 
generic notion. According to Aquinas, the good appears in every category, and 
the connection of the categories to it is not to be interpreted as a genus-species 
relation but as analogy. Just as Aquinas conceives the relation of God, the ipsum 
esse, to the being of creatures in terms of an analogia entis, so does he determine 
the relation of the universalis fons boni to the individual goods as analogia boni. 
Whereas Aristotle rejects the understanding of “good” as something “universal 
and common,” Aquinas makes the concept of a universale bonum, in which all of 
the particular goods participate, into one of the most important concepts of his 
doctrine on happiness. Aquinas, therefore, does not reject Augustine and adopt 
Aristotle in his determination of the nal goal in the sense of the ultimus nis 
cuius. Instead, the contrary is true: He holds fast to Augustine against Aristotle. 
Critique of the Possibilities of Happiness in Earthly Life (Q. 5)
Characteristic of Aquinas’ doctrine on happiness is the distinction between 
the imperfect happiness (beatitudo imperfecta) that is attainable in earthly 
life, and the perfect happiness (beatitudo perfecta) of transcendent life. Some 
historians of philosophy suggest that Aquinas’ re!ections on the possibilities of 
 21 Aristotle, Metaphysics I 9, 991a 21-23; 992a 29.
 22  Cf. In I Metaph. lectio 10 n. 153-156. For this topic cf. Leo Elders, Die Metaphysik des 
"omas von Aquin in historischer Perspektive (Salzburg: Pustet, 1985), 1:178-185. 
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happiness in earthly life are particularly dependent on Aristotle, for Augustine 
concentrates, from the beginning, on eternity. One should observe, however, 
that Augustine had already distinguished between a vita beata of earthly life and 
a vita beatissima in the herea!er.23
Since Aristotle knows nothing of the life herea!er, he is compelled to 
establish the highest human happiness as taking place in earthly life. Hellenistic 
philosophers, namely the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Cicero, agree with him 
on this point. Augustine, however, sharply criticizes the doctrine of earthly 
happiness.24 He emphasizes that human life is necessarily a"icted with ills, and 
consequently, there can be no perfectly happy life on earth. Earthly goods are 
impermanent: bodily and mental sickness can befall a person; the su#ering of 
pains is inevitable; in collective life, there is wickedness, injustice, and war, and 
at the end, representing everything that militates against natural human striving, 
there is death.
In q.5 a.3 of his happiness-treatise, Aquinas draws upon Augustine’s De 
civitate dei XIX in order to point out, like the Bishop of Hippo, the magnitude of 
earthly life’s ills. Ignorance, susceptibility to a#ects, sicknesses of body and mind, 
and, in particular, mortality, all diminish the degree of happiness attainable here. 
Moreover, Aquinas stresses the transience of earthly goods, especially the good 
of life itself, which all humans naturally desire. According to him, true happiness 
is impossible in earthly life because ills, su#ering, and death are unavoidable. 
Following Augustine,25 Aquinas is of the opinion that earthly happiness consists 
mostly in the hope for the perfect happiness of the a!erlife. Both of them thus 
echo the Apostle Paul, who writes in Romans 8:24: “For we are saved by hope.” 
Aquinas, along with Augustine thus attenuates the Aristotelian optimism 
regarding the possibility of earthly happiness, developing in its stead, with 
recourse to De civitate dei XIX, a realistic view of earthly life and its numerous ills. 
In his Summa contra gentiles (III 48), Aquinas argues even more explicitly 
than in his Summa theologiae against the possibility of true happiness on earth. 
Here, too, he emphasizes the transience of earthly goods and the unavoidable ills 
of this life. Even Aristotle, he explains, concedes that virtue, though the highest 
good, does not bring happiness per se but only a reduced happiness since it 
makes us, as Aristotle claims, “merely happy as humans.”26 In his Commentary on 
 23 Cf. De Civitate Dei XIX 20.
 24 Cf. ibid., XIX 4-10.
 25 Cf. ibid., XIX 20.
 26 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I 11, 1101a 20. About Aquinas’ reinterpretation of Aristotle’s 
“merely happy as humans” as beatitudo imperfecta cf. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human 
Good, 395-404.
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the Sentences, Aquinas explains that for Aristotle it is a matter of the lastingness 
of goods, which he sees in the constancy of virtue.27 But Aristotle himself knows 
that this is merely a relative lastingness. For this reason, Aquinas concludes, 
Aristotle only addresses the imperfect happiness of humans on earth. Aquinas 
thus criticizes the ethics of Aristotle because it only treats worldly life, making no 
reference to the coming eternal life. 
Perfect Happiness in Transcendent Life
Since Aristotle does not know transcendent life and therefore perfect 
happiness, Aquinas relies completely on Augustine for his own treatment of this 
subject. I will only mention the most signi!cant points of Aquinas’ doctrine of 
transcendent happiness. From a systematic perspective, it o"ers a description of 
the nis quo. More precisely, it treats the question of what belongs to the act of 
the soul that may be designated as happiness. Among other questions, Aquinas 
inquires into the signi!cance of human corporeality for perfect happiness. In 
his re#ections, two motifs cross: one more Platonic and one Christian (cf. q. 4 a. 
5). According to the Platonic motif, it is only a$er its separation from the body 
that human reason attains to the knowledge of the essence of God so crucial for 
happiness. According to the Christian motif, there is a resurrection of the body. 
e happiness of being with God is not reserved for the life of the soul alone. It 
involves rather a life of the soul reunited with the body. e Christian theme of 
a bodily existence in the eschaton is a theme that Augustine accentuated. In De 
civitate dei, Augustine argues against the Neoplatonist Porphyry that the happy 
life is not a life without the body but precisely a life in the body - though not in 
an earthly but in a trans!gured body.28 Aquinas follows Augustine in q.4 a.6, 
explaining not only that the bodiless soul !nds its completion and happiness in 
the intellectual vision of God but also that the soul is designed to possess a body 
and govern it. Since it is natural for a soul to have a body, it is incomplete without 
it. e possession of the body is then, for Aquinas, a requisite for happiness 
because it makes it perfect (perciens). is perfection does not consist in the 
fact that the possession of the body belongs to the essence of happiness. Having 
a body instead makes human happiness perfect by contributing to the human’s 
being good (bene esse). e happy life, for Aquinas, is ultimately a life in the 
body. Aquinas expressly supports his claim with statements from Augustine’s De 
civitate dei XXII 11-12 and 26-27 and De Genesi ad litteram XII 68. 29 Augustine 
 27 Cf. Sent. lib.4 d.49 q.1 a.1 qc4. 
 28 Cf. De Civitate Dei X 29; XXII 11-22; 26-27.
 29 Cf. S" I-II 4.6.
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explains in those passages that the blessed will be equal to angels in their vision 
of God but only when they will have received their resurrected bodies. As long 
as they are in a bodiless state, the souls, Augustine claims, will be held back in a 
way that prevents them from having the vision of God in full clarity. For both 
Augustine and Aquinas, this body will be a perfect one, which no longer causes 
pains, does not age, and no longer has any needs that could prevent the soul from 
moving on to the vision of God. 
Furthermore, Aquinas asks (q. 5 a. 8) about the role social goods, in 
particular friends, play in perfect happiness in the hereaer. Is the happy life 
solitary or communal? At this point, a Christian motif can be distinguished 
from an Aristotelian one. Aristotle’s ethics links happiness with autarky and 
thus arrives at the thesis that the happy life consists primarily in a life of solitary 
contemplation of the divine, and secondarily in a social life of political activity. 
e biblical motif of a people of God is, in contrast, a life in the community of 
all those humans who nd their highest good in God and see him. Augustine, 
in particular, attributed a social character to the transcendental vision of God.30 
With reference to Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram VIII, Aquinas explains that 
in their vision of God the blessed also see each other and God in each other 
(Summa theologiae I-II q. 4 a. 8). ey therefore rejoice over their community in 
God. Neighbourly love is indeed subordinate to the love of God, for Aquinas. 
As a result, the transcendent individual would also be happy in the perfect love 
of God, even if there were no other humans. Since there are other humans, 
however, according to Aquinas, the love for them !ows from the love for God. 
Aquinas, like Augustine, thus believes that the community of persons belongs 
to the perfect happiness of the beyond. In conclusion, it should be clear that 
Aquinas’ decisive motifs for his doctrine on the beatitudo perfecta are adopted 
from Augustine. 
Is Knowledge or Love the Basic Human Tendency?
At one point in the happiness-treatise, namely in Summa theologiae I-II q. 3, 
the Aristotelian heritage of Aquinas appears to come prominently to the fore. 
e question is which capacity of the human soul is particularly active in perfect 
happiness. For Aquinas, perfect human happiness consists in the vision of the 
essence of God through the intellectus speculativus. e decisive capacity of the 
human soul is, in this respect, not sensibility or the will but speculative reason. 
Aquinas places the natural human desire for knowledge at the centre. On this 
point, he follows Aristotle’s rst book of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle explains 
 30 Cf. De Genesi ad litteram VIII 47; De Civitate Dei XXII 29.
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that “all humans naturally strive for knowledge.”31 According to Aristotle, there are 
several dierent kinds of knowledge, from mere sensory perception to experiential 
knowledge, science and art, and nally wisdom as insight into the rst causes and 
principles. It is, moreover, striking that Aristotle distinguishes between a knowledge 
“that” and a knowledge “why.” e knowledge “that” something acts in such and 
such a way belongs to mere experience. But whoever knows “why” something acts 
that way possesses greater insight into the principles and causes. 
For Aquinas, the natural desire of human reason is especially directed at the 
knowledge of the cause of a given eect. However, the desire for the knowledge 
of the cause is not fullled in merely nding an existing cause, but in the 
ascertainment of the “what” or the essence of the cause. In line with Aristotle, 
Aquinas distinguishes between a knowledge “that,” i.e. that something exists 
(namely a cause) (an est) and the deeper knowledge of “what” the cause is (quid 
est).32 Reason ultimately strives for the knowledge of the essence of a cause, in 
fact the highest cause of everything. 
Aquinas applies this thought to the question concerning the knowledge 
of God.33 An investigation of being with respect to certain features like that 
of movement or order leads to the insight that there must be a cause of being 
in general, namely God. is line of thinking constitutes the foundational 
framework for all of Aquinas’ proofs of God.34 But the knowledge that God 
exists is insu$cient to fulll reason’s striving for knowledge of the cause. For 
such fulllment it is necessary to apprehend the quid est or the essence of God. 
Consequently, the human will only be completely happy when he sees the essentia 
of God, who is the rst cause of all things. In this vision, reason reaches its goal 
and its perfection. 
According to Aquinas, however, knowledge of the essence of God is not 
possible in earthly life because human reason is bound to sensory perception 
from which it must proceed in order to recognize the essentialities of things. 
ere cannot be any sensory perception of God, though, since God is a 
transcendent being. e limitation of the human cognitive faculties to sensible 
objects will only be removed in transcendental perfection.35 It is only at that time 
that humans will be capable of the contemplative vision of God’s essence.
Although Aristotle does not know anything about a vision of God in the 
hereaer, Aquinas nevertheless formulates his thesis on the visio beatica, as the 
 31 Aristotle, Metaphysics I 1, 980a 21.
 32 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics I 1, 981a 28f.; Analytica posteriora I 8.
 33 Cf. S" I-II 3.8.
 34 Cf. S" I 2. 3; ScG I 13.
 35 Cf. S" I 12.4; 12.11; ScG III 52; Sent. lib.4 d.49 q.2 a.6. 
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fulllment of the natural human desire for knowledge, by means of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics and theory of science. Nothing in Aquinas’ argument is foreign to 
Augustine, however. e idea that perfect happiness consists in an intellectual 
vision of God in the aerlife is something which Aquinas also read in Augustine.36 
Aquinas also repeatedly refers to Augustine’s description of the highest happiness 
as “joy in the truth.”37 He interprets this statement in the sense that “truth” 
designates the vision of the essence of God through speculative reason, while 
“joy” refers to the fulllment of striving and the repose of the will.38 But the 
thesis of a natural human striving for the knowledge of God also plays an integral 
role for Augustine. He writes, for example, that God is naturally known by every 
human under the name of truth, which all humans love.39 Consequently, when 
Aquinas adopts the Aristotelian conception of a natural striving for knowledge, 
he in no way contradicts the view of Augustine. 
Nevertheless, a certain shi in accent may be said to exist between Aquinas 
and Augustine. is accentual dierence emerges in the details of their respective 
descriptions of the “natural striving” of humans toward God. Under the inuence 
of Aristotle, Aquinas interprets this striving primarily as a desire for knowledge. 
His understanding of the highest happiness as a perfect knowledge thus has an 
intellectualistic hue. It is by no means self-evident that the goal of life should 
reside in knowledge. Augustine’s conception of happiness, on the contrary, is less 
intellectualistic. He characterizes natural human striving more in terms of the 
longing for peace and the heart’s rest and as the fulllment of love. “Restless is our 
heart until it rests in you.”40 It is not without reason that while Augustine is oen 
portrayed as the man with the burning heart, St omas Aquinas is typically 
depicted as a professor with a book in his hands or conducting a disputatio. 
 36 Cf. De Civitate Dei (XXII 29), De Genesi ad litteram (XII 54-69), and De Trinitate I 7. 
Aquinas quotes from De Trinitate I 7 in q.3 a.5 (sed contra) and q.4 a.1.
 37 Gaudium in veritate (Confessiones X 33).
 38 Cf. S! I-II 3.4; 4.1. 
 39 Cf. Confessiones X 33.
 40 Ibid., I 1. 
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